Events in the vicinity of the European Union are constantly challenging the EU's foreign policy, but complex internal governance processes have been hampering the EU from responding coherently. This analysis of the Northern Dimension Initiative considers whether the EU is compensating for this dilemma by adopting an innovative network governance strategy to integrate those external actors in the European North who can bring complementary resources to the policy-making processes. The formulation and execution of EU foreign policy may thus be alleviated, and the lack of internal problem-solving capacity does not automatically lead to failure in foreign policy-making.
Introduction
Events beyond the borders of the European Union are constantly challenging EU foreign policy-makers in their decisions about whether and how to respond. In formulating the European Political Cooperation (EPC) throughout the 1970s and 1980s and in creating the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and security provision mechanisms in the 1990s, the member states have increasingly demonstrated their willingness to provide the EU with the necessary capacity to act with determination in international affairs. In the post-bipolar era, the motivation to develop a common European foreign policy stems in part from the growing weight of the Union in the global economy, and in part from the perception that a collective response to the changing post-bipolar international system is crucial for the protection of vital national interests. 1 The mounting readiness to formulate, steer and execute a common foreign policy has spurred a growing interest among political scientists to analyse the Union as an actor on the world stage.
2 However, the conclusions drawn so far have not been unambiguous. As observed by White (2001: 36-9) , at least three diverging perspectives have been formulated on the possibility and desirability of a European foreign policy: one perspective has it that a common foreign policy exists, albeit the term may be misleading; a second view has it that a foreign policy does not yet exist, but that it should; and finally, a third view has it that a European foreign policy should never come into existence.
Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the Cold War the Union can be regarded as acting more confidently in its relations with third countries, especially neighbouring countries. Yet, it is still unclear whether the EU is truly capable of playing a significant role internationally. Research studies reveal that the internal structures of EU governance often hamper or even paralyse the foreign policy-makers from reaching agreements on the formulation and implementation of coherent foreign policies (Zielonka, 1998) , because the member states, and to a lesser degree various EU institutions, pursue their pertinent (and at times incompatible) self-interests. Moreover, the Union's lack of relevant resources -technical and functional know-how, funding, political acknowledgement and support, legitimacy and implementation capacity -has rendered the execution of foreign relations an intricate task.
Assuming on the one hand that structural links exist between the EU's internal mode of policy-making and its external environment, and on the other hand that synergies can be drawn from these linkages, we argue that the EU is in a position to overcome inconsistencies in its foreign policymaking. This is attainable if, first, the Union recognizes the structural links between its policy-making and its external environment, and, second, acts in a way to draw synergies from these links. This argument rests on the fundamental premise that the international system is characterized by 'complex interdependence' (Keohane and Nye, 1977) , where the existence of multiple channels of contact among societies limits the control governments have over foreign relations. This, in turn, forces political actors on the world stage to rely on tangible and intangible resources provided by outsiders to formulating and designing effective policy solutions to identified challenges.
Application of this argument to EU foreign policy-making has noteworthy implications for the perception of the relations between the Union and non-member states. If interdependence characterizes relations between the EU and its external environment, it might be expected that the EU would be highly sensitive, and in some instances vulnerable to the effects of third-country policies (or non-policies). In other words, systemic interdependence implies the inability of the Union to seal itself off from its external environment, thus being affected by positive and negative policy externalities created by its neighbours. This particular notion is corroborated by the current conditions of the 'post-Cold War disorder', where the Union has found itself significantly affected by politico-economic events and 'soft security risks' in the countries geographically close to its borders; for example, ethnic rivalry, political instability, international organized crime and environmental degradation. One might thus infer that a clear structural link already exists between the Union and its external environment, and that by recognizing this link the EU will be able to harness the growing interdependence of the current international order by collaborating with third countries in the pursuit of constructive policy solutions to negative policy externalizations.
Since classical European integration theories consider the nexus between the EU and its external environment only to a limited extent, the theoretical framework of this article is in part based on an alternative interpretation of European dynamics -the multi-level governance (MLG) approach.
3 MLG allows us to focus on 'how the EU's governance system affects its capacity to act towards the outside… . Second, the very concept of governance (which is not tied to a specific geographical territory) directs our attention to the significance of boundaries in its relations with the outside' (Friis and Murphy, 1999: 213; see also Friis and Murphy, 2000) . Our attention is drawn to the possibility that, by moving a set of geopolitical, institutional/legal, transactional or cultural boundaries (Smith, 1996) , the EU is capable of creating the necessary inter-linkages between its internal and external policies needed to enhance its capacity as a foreign policy actor. We hold that a movement of boundaries provides the EU with opportunities to include within its policy-making processes those external actors who possess politically relevant resources, thereby allowing the EU to attain its individual foreign policy objectives by improving its policyshaping and implementation capacity. Moreover, the modification of boundaries can furnish the Union with the possibility to impose a degree of governance beyond its territorial borders. By providing non-member countries with needed tangible and intangible goods, the Union can exert influence upon the priorities of these countries without extending formal membership to them.
To illustrate our theoretical argument, the formulation and execution of the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) are examined to determine whether any of the 'multi-level governance' characteristics can be identified here. The NDI was officially launched by the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 and encompasses 11 North European countries -Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden. The stated objective of the Initiative is to ensure a strengthened horizontal cooperation among the political, economic and social actors of the European North, as well as intensified coordination of the multiple cooperation initiatives and funding programmes targeting the area (European Council, 2000a) . The necessity of enhanced pragmatic cooperation between the EU and external actors in Northern Europe hence supports a first impression that the Union requires resources provided by outsiders if it is to strengthen its position in international affairs.
Three tentative conclusions are drawn in relation to the empirical part. First, the EU has a substantial interest in the European North, as is evident from its willingness to underwrite the Northern Dimension strategy for the entire region to secure its own long-term influence and (soft) security goals. Second, the Union is short of, and in certain instances hesitant in providing, politically relevant resources to define and implement coherent projects, and is therefore compelled to resort to cooperative arrangements with external actors. Finally, and not unimportantly, the study indicates that the Union is developing a particular form of 'subsidiarity' in its foreign policymaking by accepting that the member states most concerned formulate and execute EU foreign policy in cooperation with those external actors capable of generating the needed problem-solving capacity.
Firstly we single out a few, but indispensable, introductory observations on the concept of EU foreign policy, and secondly we present our theoretical framework to support the understanding of EU foreign policy in light of new post-Cold War challenges. To test the propositions and explanatory power of the theoretical framework, we examine the making of the NDI and the NDI Action Plan in the next section, as well as the implications of the Union's network strategy. Finally, we summarize the main observations and discuss, tentatively, whether a movement of boundaries could create a true network governance system, leading to much more substantial involvement of external actors in the foreign policy-making processes of the European Union.
EU Foreign Policy
The EU is a difficult creature for political scientists to classify. Can it be defined as an independent political actor in the global system, or not? According to Sjøstedt (1977: 15-17) , an 'international actor' is defined as (1) a unit delimited from others and from its external environment; which (2) is autonomous, in the sense of proper law-and decision-making; and which (3) possesses certain structural prerequisites for action on the international level, such as a legal personality, a set of diplomatic agents and the capacity to conduct negotiations with third parties. Clearly, this classification cannot easily be applied to the contemporary EU, because it defines foreign policy-making as being primarily concerned with the governmental action of a coherent state in interstate games, or its relations with international organizations (White, 2001: 32-46) . The theoretical dilemma surrounding the Union as a foreign policy-maker is thus magnified by the circumstance that the Union is 'a unique, multileveled, transnational political system' (Moravcsik, 1998 : 1), a state-like non-state, professing the ambition to conduct a common foreign policy that is more than the simple sum of the foreign policies of the 'Fifteen'.
More recent theoretical contributions have, to a certain extent, helped to fill this theoretical void by focusing instead upon the EU's capabilities on the global stage subsumed under the term 'actorness'. 'Actorness' refers to a theoretical perspective that incorporates both the internal dynamics of institutional development and the changing nature of the international environment in which the Union has to operate (Hill, 1993: 309) . The concept thus diffuses the classical notion of what constitutes an 'international actor'. Additionally, Allen and Smith (1990) have elaborated the concept of 'presence', which has now become indispensable for the research agenda on the external capacity of the Union (see Antola, 1999: 126-30; Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 1-45) . 'Presence' concerns the impact of the Union's external behaviour, which does not rest solely upon its 'actorness', but rather on its variable and multidimensional presence. The concept thus emphasizes 'outside perceptions of the Community and the significant effect it has on both the psychological and the operational environments of third parties' (Hill, 1993: 309) . Consequently, 'presence' and 'actorness' are essential for understanding the structural linkages between the 'inside' and the 'outside' of the Union -its institutions, its resources and its policy context. Moreover, the concepts accentuate that the Union may be defined as a 'multi-actored' and multi-levelled autonomous, but simultaneously highly interdependent political entity in regard to external actors and outside perceptions. It generates international relations (collectively, individually, politically and economically) while simultaneously being a subsystem of international relations as a whole (Taylor, 1982; Hill, 1993: 322) .
The EU's 'Actorness' and 'Presence' in its Direct Neighbourhood
As the concepts 'actorness' and 'presence' are closely interlinked, Hill (1993) maintains that a so-called 'capability-expectations gap' is originating from the inherent tension between them. He concludes that 'if the gap is to be closed and a dangerous tension relieved in European foreign policy, then either capabilities will have to be increased or expectations decreased' (p. 321). In the past decade, the Union's 'capability-expectations gap' has been particularly evident in its relations with its Central and Eastern European (CEEC) neighbours. During the Cold War period, the European Community (EC) abstained from developing any common policies towards its Northern and Eastern periphery owing to the constraints imposed by the bipolarity of the world system. The EC's 'image of itself as sharply distinct from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe … and communism made redundant any mental or substantive preparation for a dramatic change in the relationship' (Sedelmeier and Wallace, 1996: 354 ). Yet, with the demise of bipolarity the EC rapidly became 'a magnet and a model for the countries of Eastern Europe' (Hill, 1993: 313) . As the coordinator and promoter of (soft) security, stability and democratic values in those countries, the Union became the focus of the CEECs' and other third countries' expectations. 4 The EC responded by establishing an extensive range of formalized relations with the CEECs and the Newly Independent States (NIS), covering trade cooperation and limited political dialogue to support these countries in the implementation of reform programmes to ease the transition away from communism and temper the development of ultra-nationalism.
Nevertheless, even though the profound transformations of the former communist societies are of utmost importance to the Union, observers have characterized the foreign policy responses as 'crabwise', incremental and lacking visionary grand designs. As emphasized by Forster and Wallace (1998: 346-52) , the development of a competent strategy was 'inhibited by the disjointed processes of change, rolling from one former socialist state to another… . But it was also inhibited by the structural weaknesses of the Community itself and by the absence of consensus among Member States'. The inability of the EU to fulfil the expectations of the CEECs supports the hypothesis that features of the Union's internal system of governance impede the formulation and execution of an effective and coherent foreign policy even if this is a stated principle in the Treaty on European Union.
The EU's Cross-Pillar Difficulties and Lack of Relevant Resources
As convincingly pointed out by Ginsberg (1999 Ginsberg ( , 2001 ), Smith (1999) and Ojanen (2000) , the EU is not yet a fully-fledged foreign policy actor capable of functioning actively and deliberately on the international stage -the main reason being that the internal policy-making processes are exposed to diverse sets of difficulties. These range from fragmentation of decision-making rules, conflicting national interests to lack of technical and financial resources and excessive expectations compared to capabilities. 5 Jointly, these difficulties are impeding the Union in setting collective goals and putting into motion any collective action in pursuit of these goals. The Union therefore has 'serious problems in transforming its normative strength into operational capability; it is ineffective in shaping the international environment in any instrumental fashion' (Ojanen, 2000: 374) .
Foreign policy competencies are spread across pillars and actors, and the shaping and execution of foreign policies thus require a complex crosspillar strategy and a considerable number of tangible and intangible resources. The competencies for external trade policy, as well as development and humanitarian aid, pertain to Pillar I, while matters relating to security and defence and justice and home affairs fall under Pillars II and III, respectively. In other words, EU foreign policy-making ranges from (quasi-) independent supranational representation by the Commission in Pillar I affairs to the intergovernmental coordination among the member states in Pillars II and III affairs, thus creating a host of cross-pillar difficulties in EU foreign policy formulation.
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In addition to the complications resulting from the cross-pillar and multiparticipatory characteristics of EU's foreign policy, it has been suggested that the Union must complement its current resources with resources from outsiders if it is to shape and implement coherent strategies in its direct neighbourhood (Smith, 1996; Gänzle, 2002) . That is, the EU is in need of external co-financiers for its policy initiatives, and it requires additional technical resources and externally generated expertise to define purposeful and relevant projects and programmes. Finally, implementation capacity of the EU is lacking because its human, technical and financial resources are incomplete.
EU Foreign Policy-Making Revisited
Not infrequently have discussions among scholars in regard to the international capabilities of the EU led to the conclusion that the Union acts with neither credence nor authority, because it is hampered from executing its foreign policies effectively. Yet, the identification of novel interaction patterns between the Union and its external environment has given rise to a new and passionate academic debate. The key questions raised are whether accurate analyses of EU foreign policy-making require the re-fashioning of established theoretical interpretations, or whether the application of new conceptual frameworks and theories is required in its place (see, e.g., Smith, 1996; Friis and Murphy, 1999) . Owing to the space constraints of this article, we do not review the debate here. We suggest instead that the position and character of the EU in international affairs can be re-conceptualized, because the planning and execution of foreign policy towards the European North reflect new predispositions. In essence, we argue that while the ongoing debate about the EU's foreign capacity is undeniably fruitful, it is incomplete. If the networking capabilities of the Union are not taken into consideration, it is futile to make a priori assumptions about the relative strength enjoyed by the Union in policy-making aimed beyond its borders.
While agreeing with the premises of earlier contributions (Sedelmeier and Wallace, 1996; Friis and Murphy, 1999; Ginsberg, 1999; Ojanen, 2000) , we acknowledge that the EU is willing to pursue an influential role in international relations, but that it lacks the necessary overall problem-solving capacity. We move the theoretical argument one step further in suggesting that scarcity of resources does not automatically lead to failure in foreign policy-making, failure being defined as output that is ineffective in meeting the stated objectives and without influence over the functional outcome of international bargains. Rather, we suggest that the Union, by adopting an innovative network governance strategy, will strengthen its problemsolving capacity and thus its 'actorness' and 'presence' in its interaction with non-member countries.
The concept of network governance, as applied in this article, is constructed in part from some of the central aspects of the MLG concept formulated with reference to the Euro-polity. The concept is closely related to the Comparative Politics approach in EU studies, emphasizing 'informal, loose structures that extend across and beyond hierarchies' (Jachtenfuchs, 2001: 254) . The governance school recognizes, first, that as the empirical setting for the political steering of society is transforming into more complex, diversified and dynamic realities, the EU, to shoulder its responsibilities, is compelled to invent new mechanisms with which to avoid the unintended consequences of central policies and, in particular, to control deficits in policy implementation (Scharpf, 1993; Kohler-Koch, 1996; Marks et al., 1996; Hix, 1998; Moravcsik, 1998; Scharpf, 2001; Jachtenfuchs, 2001 ).
Second, governance in the EU is characterized by the dispersion of authoritative power and competencies between various levels of governance and between different sets of political players within the Union. Accordingly, the EU is to be conceived as a political arena populated by formally autonomous subnational, national and supranational actors linked by multifaceted interdependencies that coordinate policy space and scarce resources in reaching collective solutions to joint or individual challenges. In both 'domestic' and international affairs the EU has thus become dependent upon joint resource mobilization with political players beyond its hierarchical control (see in particular Kohler-Koch, 1996; Marks et al., 1996; Scharpf, 2001) .
Consequently, state-centric explanations of European integration, describing a hierarchical distribution of power among different tiers of government, carry only limited explanatory value, because they confer the most influential positions in international relations a priori upon state actors. The image of decisions as generated in hierarchical and confrontational structures legitimated through general elections, and under the control of politically accountable ministers or chief executives (Scharpf, 1993: 8) , accordingly prevents the generation of a more sophisticated understanding of the input, functioning and output of non-hierarchical political processes where competence-sharing is a dominant characteristic.
Applying the findings of the MLG interpretation on EU foreign policy entails that policy, in this case, is executed via the resource-exchanges taking place between the EU and its external environment. That is, the nonmember countries, international organizations or substate actors willing to coordinate their policy spaces and scarce resources with the Union in order to realize shared political and economic projects. A second core feature of the theoretical framework presented here concerns its operationalization. We argue that network governance is defined and established by the modification of boundaries.
Boundaries and Network Governance
The concept of 'boundary' differs significantly from the concept of 'border', with the latter an unambiguous concept referring to the territorial, geographical and recognizable borders of the Union, defined by membership. Consequently, boundaries differ from borders, as the extension of boundaries does not require the widening of the Union but rather the application of governance patterns below the membership line (Friis and Murphy, 1999) . Briefly, network governance does not require any direct match between membership, territory and governance. Rather, the logic of boundaries is connected to the rights of access to and participation in EU policymaking, i.e. a boundary change to establish a network governance system is a technique used to change the division between decision-makers and decision-takers.
Michael Smith (1996) identifies four types of boundaries of critical significance to the EU, i.e. boundaries that already exist or can be constructed between the Union and the outside: (1) a geopolitical boundary which, during the Cold War, was producing a dividing line between the EU, 'an island of stability', and the disorderly and threatening outside world; (2) an institutional/legal boundary defining the institutional and legal framework within which the EU operates. It gives the EU an image of a 'community of law' and the promoter of civic statehood; (3) a transactional boundary by which the EU regulates market accession for third countries; and finally (4) a cultural boundary that is relatively permeable, as established between the inside and the outside on grounds of democratic and political values and human rights.
The essence of network governance is thus the EU, in moving its external boundaries, becoming capable of underwriting an inclusive, but loosely constructed policy space with international organizations and candidate and non-candidate countries to upgrade its problem-solving capacity. Moreover, the EU can increase its 'actorness' and 'presence' in external affairs as it communicates its ideas and visions through the network governance structures. For external entities, private as well as public, the externalization of internal EU governance patterns amplifies the access channels to the EU policy-making process, but also confers upon them more extensive responsibilities for the execution of joint decisions. Even if this strategy of moving boundaries seems to lead to 'fuzzy borders because they produce interfaces or intermediate spaces between the inside and the outside of the polity' (Christiansen et al., 2000: 393) , EU borders are not vanishing or become meaningless. Indeed, the borders still define the member states in the policy networks, which comprise diverging partner constellations depending on the subject matter and the participating units' need to define collective solutions to the challenges confronting them.
Conversely, network governance and boundary modifications have a considerable impact on the mode of governance within the Union. The evident advantage for the Union is that it will be capable of developing and nurturing a particular form of 'subsidiarity' in its foreign policy-making (Hill, 1993: 325; Johansson, 2000 Johansson, , 2002 by accepting that member states most concerned design and execute EU foreign policy together with the original policy-takers. This obviously demands that these member states lobby the remaining member states (and to some extent the European Commission) to devise a strategy outlining the overall priorities in regard to a particular geographical area. Responsibility for the tasks that are not directly connected with strategic decision-taking, such as the design of cooperation projects, implementation, monitoring of activities and evaluation, would then fall on the member states most concerned and external partners, in close cooperation with the European Commission. 'Subsidiarity' of this kind enables the Union to establish a governance structure and authority over the geographical areas closest to its borders, while steering clear of details that might spur serious discussions among the Fifteen and subsequently lead to incoherence and ineffectiveness of its external policies. Moreover, burden-sharing with external partners frees scarce resources within the Union. By preventing all Fifteen from engaging in micro-management of every aspect of EU foreign policy, coherence in the Union's external relations is likely to improve. Creation of policy networks integrating external actors can therefore be conceived as a tempting alternative to the current incoherence of the Union's capabilities.
From a strict instrumentalist point of view, resource exchanges in a network system imply that those external actors who possess politically relevant resources will find themselves in a preferential situation in comparison to entities unable to supply any relevant complementary resources. In other words, the former group of actors, even if non-member states, may obtain a central position in the EU's foreign policy-making for the geographical area they are located in, which definitely changes the distinction between policy-makers and policy-takers. By contrast, the obvious disadvantage of constructing institutionalized relations with external entities is that the EU by its actions signals its need of externally generated resources. Consequently, it may experience that an external actor is holding it, and perhaps other external actors, to ransom by refusing to share its resources with the remaining network members. One example is the sometimes uncooperative behaviour of Russia in the Baltic Sea region (Ojanen, 2000: 374) . Such incidences make network governance with outsiders a rather unproductive strategy to embark on. However, this particular situation is difficult to envision in the post-bipolar era, where political dialogue is no longer the exclusive prerogative of national governments, but also incorporates nonstate actors such as multinational companies, NGOs, social associations, religious communities and local/regional authorities. It would thus be difficult for one networking partner to completely block the resource exchange in that the political dialogue could then fairly easily be switched to a different interaction level with a different composition of network partners.
An additional disadvantage of sharing policy-making competence with external entities concerns the basic functioning of the Union itself. The blurring of the distinction between insiders and outsiders, which confers upon non-members the ability to influence EU policy-making in external affairs, has raised severe concerns among EU members. To take one example; during the consultations leading up to the NDI, a 'disagreement on the issue [was] clear: not all have approved of the fact that the EU discusses with the partner countries before a united EU view has emerged' (Ojanen, 2000: 373) . The blurring of the distinction between policy-takers and policymakers may for that reason lead to a decrease in the effectiveness of the foreign policy-making itself, because it raises tensions among the member states with reference to decision-making procedures, membership rights and burden-sharing.
On the other hand, the creation of an intriguing web of interdependencies and inter-linkages among formally sovereign states in Europe has clear advantages. From the initiation of the ECSC, it has been claimed that the 'construction' of interdependencies is a most efficient way of avoiding the risk of armed conflicts on the European continent. It could be inferred that the very stability and security of post-enlargement Europe will depend on the success of the EU in creating network governance systems with its closest geographical neighbours. The construction of loosely fitted policy spaces and the altering of EU boundaries could lead to the avoidance of future geopolitical rifts in Europe and beyond. But to what extent a network governance strategy in foreign policy-making will lead to optimal outcomes depends, obviously, on an evaluation of the advantages and drawbacks of the particular strategies.
To inform the conceptual framework with empirical research, the focus now turns to the NDI. In the 'post-Wall' scenario the EU has fundamentally redefined its policies towards the Northern part of Europe. Today it has completed a wide range of institutionalized relations with the countries of the region; Sweden and Finland became members of the Union in 1995, the three Baltic republics are candidates, so too is Poland. Norway and Iceland have decided to abstain from membership but are closely affiliated to the Union through the European Economic Area (EEA) agreements. The largest country of the region, Russia, is equally well associated with the EU through a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). To provide a common framework and reference for the countries of the region, the EU launched the NDI, covering the geographical area stretching from Iceland in the West across to Northwest Russia, and from the Norwegian, Barents and Kara Seas in the North to the Southern coast of the Baltic Sea.
The Making of the Northern Dimension Initiative
The accession of Finland and Sweden to the EU in 1995 added a new dimension to the EU's foreign policy, which had until then primarily focused on the CEEC and the Mediterranean. Northern Europe, in the shape of the NDI, formally became an item on the EU's foreign policy agenda at the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997, after a substantial lobbying effort by the Finnish government (Arter, 2000: 679 ff.) . Initially, the NDI was met with suspicion in some EU member states, fearful of reallocation of EC funds to the detriment of their own interests. There was thus a perception at the time that the NDI was accepted merely as a way of satisfying the foreign policy demands of the two new Nordic member states and other political players with an interest in Northern Europe.
Notwithstanding, the NDI fulfils two basic purposes for the Union as a whole. First, it is conceived as an indispensable complement to the current EU enlargement process to prepare the three Baltic States and Poland for accession. Second, the Initiative provides a multilateral cooperation framework complementing the EU's bilateral efforts to integrate Russia, as well as Norway and Iceland, further in a wider European institutional architecture. The Initiative thereby serves as a framework strengthening the Union's current external policies and available instruments in Northern Europe. Simultaneously, it serves as an instrument reinforcing the 'positive interdependence' and dialogue between Russia, the Barents and Baltic Sea regions and the Union (European Commission, 1998) . The objectives of the NDI are 'to increase prosperity, strengthen security and resolutely combat dangers such as environmental pollution, nuclear risks and cross-border organised crime' (European Council, 1999a The NDI Action Plan is implemented through the bilateral legal accords concluded with each of the partner countries (EEA with Norway and Iceland, Europe Agreements with Poland and the Baltic States and the PCA with Russia) in conjunction with relevant political, economic and social actors of the European North. Moreover, the NDI is financed by Community budget-lines, i.e. the INTERREG, Phare, TACIS, ISPA and SAPARD programmes and by cooperation partners, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the OECD Baltic Regional Program, the World Bank, the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB), the US Northern European Initiative (NEI) as well as by other public and private donors providing aid to the region. The success of the NDI will depend on the Union's ability to consolidate Northern Europe as a single policy space. This can by done by further opening up policy-making processes to the NDI actors by redrawing the four essential boundaries: the geopolitical, institutional/legal, transactional and the cultural.
Geopolitical Boundary
The first boundary in the process of being modified is the geopolitical boundary. During the Cold War, political initiatives in the Baltic Sea region were largely conditioned by the East-West bipolar rift dividing the region into two opposing camps. In the past decade this erstwhile geopolitical division has gradually been blurred through the launching of a number of bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives. Furthermore, the circumstances that Poland has been accepted as a member of NATO, and that Poland and the Baltic states will become full members of the EU in the near future, have contributed to the blurring of the geopolitical boundary. By launching the Northern Dimension the EU has shown willingness to support this process of geopolitical rapprochement in creating a broad and inclusive political framework for Northern Europe. Albeit coming into being as a mere concession to Finnish (and other Nordic) foreign policy interests at first, the NDI is now consolidated on the European agenda as a model for how post-enlargement Europe should be constructed. In Brussels and other southern member state capitals it is increasingly being recognized that the Initiative's decentralized cross-border and interregional cooperation, carried out by multiple state and non-state actors, is a successful strategy for avoiding a 'fortress Europe' closed off from its neighbours. Indeed, the network strategy has worked so satisfactorily that there are even talks about possibly creating an 'Eastern Dimension' along the Union's Eastern border (with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, etc.) to avoid geopolitical fault-lines as soon as the first wave of CEECs have become EU members (Bertelsmann Foundation and Center for Applied Policy Research, 2001: 38) .
Today, the NDI enables a multilateral political dialogue between the Union, its member states, candidates and non-candidate countries in the European North. The first step in the direction of consolidating this dialogue was taken by the preparatory work leading to the adoption of the Northern Dimension Action Plan in 2000. The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 invited the Commission to 'prepare in cooperation with the Council and in consultation with the partner countries, an Action Plan for the Northern Dimension' (European Council, 1999b, emphasis added) . Following this initial step, the Union, represented by the Commission, member states and partner countries, has deliberated the NDI in the framework of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) 8 and the Barents EuroArctic Council (BEAC). 9 The CBSS and BEAC meetings have been particularly useful in bringing the majority of interested actors in Northern Europe together and in helping to set the regional agenda as well as in building coalitions to confront the challenges in the European North (Arter, 2000: 693) . In fact, the CBSS and BEAC have been two crucial elements upon which to construct the Northern Dimension. Without the previous coordination of their respective policy spaces (region-building) and insistence on creating synergies with EU policies (enlargement, EEA, PCA) in the region, the NDI network strategy simply would not prosper. Conceptually, one might therefore infer that the blueprint for NDI has drawn extensively on the CBSS/BEAC cooperation initiatives and experiences. Finally, two Northern Dimension Foreign Minister conferences, held in Helsinki 1999 and in Luxembourg 2001, have provided further opportunities for dialogue and the exchange of ideas and concerns. These conferences served as common political platforms enabling senior officials (the attendance of foreign ministers has been insignificant) from the EU and member states to meet with representatives from regional organizations such as the CBSS, BEAC, the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Baltic Council of Ministers, International Financial Institutions, as well as with players at the subnational level (Foreign Ministers' Conference, 1999: v) .
The NDI provides a multilateral framework within which external partners can be consulted on matters relating to Northern Europe and it is the first time the EU has applied such a formula, 10 allowing external actors to influence EU policy-making (to a greater or lesser degree). 11 The political dialogue and the inclusiveness of the NDI are designed as confidencebuilding processes between the countries of the Baltic and Barents Sea regions, as well as between the EU and these countries, in preventing the establishment of new geopolitical fault-lines between 'ins' and 'outs' in post-enlargement Europe. The German CBSS Presidency (2000) (2001) and the Swedish EU Presidency in 2001 both stressed the need for further consolidation of the policy channels and the regularization of meetings towards ensuring partners' participation and input, as well as an efficient division of labour between regional and international institutions (Swedish EU Presidency, 2001 ).
Institutional/Legal Boundary
Within the context of the NDI, the institutional/legal boundary of the EU is perhaps the most rigid and difficult to modify. It is at the very centre of the system of EU governance in terms of the density of institutions and practices in the EU and in its status as a community of law and promoter of civic rights (Friis and Murphy, 1999: 216) . As inclusion within the institutional boundary of the Union is a synonym for full membership of the Union, movement is a highly sensitive issue for some EU member states, i.e. any movement challenges the EU governance system at its very core. While the NDI does not contemplate a movement of the institutional boundary in Northern Europe, it is attempting to modify the legal boundary. The end of the Cold War has given rise to different 'soft' security challenges in the Baltic and Barents Sea regions and one of the high priorities of the NDI is therefore the fight against organized crime, money-laundering and the trafficking of drugs, small arms and human beings. These issues cannot be dealt with effectively without a considerable alignment of legal frameworks between the EU and partner countries, the absence of which would undermine any viable EU policy on the issue. The NDI thus supports a comprehensive approach to the management of borders in Europe's North, to ensure that similar criteria are applied on each side of an EU external border relating to customs, migration, phytosanitary and veterinary controls, the private sectors (banks, customs agents) and border infrastructure.
In terms of border management, the NDI encompasses a range of activities, including twinning programmes for border officials from partner countries and the TACIS CBC border-crossing programme ($53.6 million in 1996-2000) for crossing and border management. Moreover, the Northern Dimension has moved to integrate the Task Force on Organized Crime in the Baltic Sea region within its framework. 12 The Task Force has undertaken various joint operations between law enforcement agencies at land, sea and air borders, targeting illegal migration, stolen cars and drugs. Cooperation between authorities to combat organized crime in EU and partner countries supports the cross-border harmonization of legal norms and laws dealing with this kind of criminal activity among all NDI countries. Here, as in many areas of the NDI, the CBSS/BEAC, in realizing that a coordinated EU-NDI partner response is the most efficient, have been active in transposing their regional agendas, targeting problems and proposing solutions on the European level. The harmonization of legal regimes will become particularly important once the current EU enlargement process is completed. It will provide a vehicle for Russia, Norway and Iceland and ensure that differentiated legal frameworks do not provide havens for criminal elements, while causing destabilizing influences in the rest of Northern Europe. The NDI-JHA cooperation could even serve as a test case for NDI partner countries seeking closer integration with parts of the EU acquis.
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Transactional Boundary
The transactional boundary is the third boundary in the process of modification by the NDI. This is perhaps the network governance boundary easiest to operationalize, and where the biggest advances have been made. The end of the Cold War opened up possibilities for economic interaction between the EU and its neighbours. As market economy principles were adopted in the East, and administrative and trade barriers came down, trade between Western and Eastern Europe took off. The Northern Dimension intends to complement the existing bilateral relations between the EU and the European North through the creation of a multilateral trade regime and the reduction of trade barriers among Northern European countries. As a result, the NDI is enhancing the possibilities for successful, greater economic integration through the harmonization of economic conditions and practices across borders, which often entails a de facto adjustment of candidate and partner countries' business norms and regimes to fit those of the Union.
Inspired by the recommendations of the Tallinn Northern Dimension Business Forum (2001), the European Council in Gothenburg of 2001 called for increased deregulation, proper enforcement and application of legislation, fair competition, equal treatment and non-discrimination. It also called for transparency in the business environment in order to create a level playing field in the NDI region for all the Baltic Sea economic actors (Swedish EU Presidency, 2001: 5) . Moreover, the NDI aims at boosting the needed parameters for economic development and growth by for example eliminating barriers to trade and foreign investment, by improving crossborder transit and by building roads, ports, Internet networks, and so on. Moreover, the NDI aims to integrate energy grids and bring markets across the member-non-member divide into line, thus creating an integrated area of energy in the forum of Baltic Sea Region Energy Co-operation (BAS-REC). Subsequently, these energy grids will be linked up with the rest of Europe via Trans-European Networks (TEN), providing a stable energy supply and thus promoting further economic development in the whole of Europe.
The Northern Dimension thus facilitates and provides added value in the ongoing process of economic integration, where candidate states (with the carrot of eventual accession to the EU) have advanced far in adopting the acquis for trade and investment. In Russia, where the economic problems are more complex, fewer advances have been made. However, in general, it could be inferred that there is a clear trend toward many EU neighbouring countries adapting voluntarily ('anticipatory adaptation') to EU market and trade principles. The size and importance of the European market act as clear incentives or 'pull forces' for neighbouring non-member countries to adapt their market practices into becoming more compatible with those of the Union.
Cultural Boundary
The fourth and final boundary to be modified by the Northern Dimension is the cultural boundary -the Union would like to see its neighbours adopting values such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The NDI Action Plan manifests this long-term objective, professing that the NDI should attempt to encourage 'European values' among its Northern European partners through its cooperation programmes. Initiatives such as interregional and cross-border cooperation at the subnational level, targeting local democracy, public administration, health and education are to be strengthened.
Another initiative envisioned by the NDI is exchange programmes for young people '[which] would reinforce in new generations democratic values, [and] support for further socio-economic reforms' (European Council, 2000b: point 77) in Northern Europe. The Action Plan foresees that such exchange programmes could even lead to the creation of a European identity and 'European-ess'. Finally, the NDI has attempted to mould the institutional culture of the EU's partners through twinning programmes between EU and partner country administrations. For example, the Tempus Institution Building programme is clearly focused on changing the administrative and institutional structures in non-EU countries (European Council, 2000b: point 28) .
Conclusions
The end of the East-West conflict enabled the Union to manoeuvre its boundaries towards Northern Europe in a more flexible, creative and, some would say, opportunistic way in the pursuit of strengthened actorness and presence. Incrementally, by including external actors in its foreign policymaking processes, the EU has adopted an innovative network strategy for managing its immediate neighbourhood which allows it to influence the shaping and creation of a policy space of shared geopolitical, legal, transactional and cultural features in Northern Europe. Moreover, the strategy has provided the EU with additional tangible and intangible resources necessary to materialize its visions for a stable European North, while simultaneously enhancing its actorness as a foreign policy actor. This observation supports the finding by Linjakumpu (2000: 6) that '… the more the EU is integrated into its international environments, and the more international actors and practices are integrated into the EU, the more influential and visible the EU is in the international arena'. As we have argued, this strategy was intentional, although dependent on the active involvement of EU members with interests at stake, as well as 'outsiders' willing to comply with the cooperative arrangement set out jointly in a process of externalization of network governance. Clearly, the fact that Russia is likely to accept its European vocation is a condition sine qua non for development of the NDI.
The unambiguous benefit emanating from this mode of network governance is its potential to generate viable solutions to a great many of the economic, political and environmental challenges confronting Europe's North with minimum involvement from Brussels. As the above analysis of the NDI illustrates, flexibility and responsiveness are ensured, because a number of tasks and responsibilities related to the socio-economic transition of the post-communist societies are now shared between the Union, the member states mostly concerned, neighbouring countries and regional organizations such as the BEAC and the CBSS. The analytical findings in this article thus support a first tentative conclusion that the Union is developing a particular form of 'subsidiarity' in its foreign policy-making. It is accepted that the member states most concerned function as the motor of cooperation, that is, they formulate the foreign policy towards the European North and have established a central position for themselves in the implementation of this policy in close cooperation with external actors.
Nevertheless, the question remains whether the EU's efforts to move its boundaries towards the European North will create a sustainable network governance system leading to more extensive involvement of non-member states and regional organizations in EU foreign policy-making. As argued by Smith (1996: 25) the boundaries in the wake of the Cold War 'have simply moved to accommodate new political and other realities: more is included in the EU, but this does not mean that a politics of inclusion has fully established itself'. As we have seen in the analysis, certain elements of the NDI support Smith's observation. The networking strategy assists the Union in overcoming some of its cross-pillar inconsistencies; it generates coherence between its financial instruments, and the EU is clearly trying to open up aspects of its policy-making to neighbouring countries. However, many doubts remain. The NDI Action Plan has been seriously criticized for being too focused on technicalities, short on ambition and lacking the funds and long-term visions for developments in Northern Europe.
Further development and perfection of the networking strategy is dependent on how well the Union consolidates Northern Europe, in cooperation with its partners, into a single, shared policy space. First and foremost, the EU has to provide the necessary incentives for external actors to cooperate multilaterally. In particular, it will be important for the EU to ensure that Russia is provided with the necessary incentives to engage in the creation of new regional links and the strengthening of existing ones. Secondly, the channels of political input and dialogue must be strengthened and regularized in order to ensure transparency in the NDI, as well as to guarantee that all participants are being heard and are offered equal access to the Union policy-making process. This will ensure that the Northern tier does not remain artificially divided between policy-takers and policy-makers. Finally, the Union has to guarantee that its institutions are capable of seizing the majority of the opportunities stemming from such a network governance strategy. Creativity in the management of mutual dependence and the resources exchanged among actors and institutions is therefore an indispensable requirement if the NDI is to succeed.
1. In this article, European foreign policy refers to the formulation and execution of diplomatic and foreign policy actions of the CFSP, as well as initiatives with an external dimension of Pillar I (EC) and III (JHA).
2. See Tonra's (2000) recent classification of contributions to the growing literature on EU foreign policy analysis.
3. Contributions to the intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist strands of scholarship do not deal explicitly with the foreign relations of the Union. These tend to be inward-looking, with a focus on the 'internal motors and brakes of integration' (Friis and Murphy, 1999: 212; see also Falkner, 1996; Schmitter, 1996; Ginsberg, 1999) . However, early neo-functionalist writings did draw attention to the interactions between regional integration and the wider global order (see e.g. Nye, 1971) .
4. Indeed, the expectations of the EU's neighbours increased dramatically as the prospects of potential accession to the Union were offered. This triggered a process of 'anticipatory adaptation' to the acquis in both candidate and non-candidate countries, even though the so-called Europe Agreements did not explicitly mandate such adaptation (Nicolaïdis, 1993) .
5. Hill (1998) revisits his hypothesis on the capability-expectation gap, concluding that the gap is indeed still present.
6. This notion is in line with Paul Taylor (1982) , who argues that European foreign policy is essentially decentralized, consisting of three strands -national foreign policy, European foreign policy and the external relations of the EC.
7. The Action Plan is a reference document setting up a number of activities to be planned or implemented in Northern Europe during 2000-3. Targeted areas identified are: environment, energy, human and scientific resources, health, business cooperation and investment promotion, justice and home affairs, as well as the future status of Kaliningrad (European Council, 2000b) .
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10. Interview with Peter Stenlund, Finnish Foreign Ministry, August 2000. 11. For example, a Russian, Polish and Lithuanian proposal for strengthening human resources in Kaliningrad, as well as ideas from subnational business entities, has recently been included in the NDI framework (Foreign Ministers' Conference, 2000) .
12. Established in 1996 by the CBSS and the European Commission, the Task Force can invite the EU Presidency and Europol on an ad hoc basis to discuss matters of common concern, thus ensuring a seamless collaboration on JHA matters in Northern Europe.
13. This concept may be developed further in the future when re-enforced and differentiated integration, as suggested by the Nice Treaty, could be opened up to non-EU countries wishing to adhere to different parts of the EU acquis without becoming full members. An example of this could be Norway and Iceland's participation in Schengen, and in various facets of the Union's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as well as adherence to the acquis governing the Single Market.
